On Tuesday 25 August 2026 I spoke in favour of a motion dissenting against the Speaker's ruling on suppression orders concerning the identity of a high-profile Queensland man. The ruling came after my attempts to question the expenditure of public funds on legal costs to maintain the suppression order.
You can read my full speech below, or in the official parliamentary record of proceedings (Hansard).
I rise to make a contribution on this motion. I do so largely because the decision that is being dissented against relates to a question that reflects one I had asked earlier in that sitting week, and equally because my comments in a previous debate informed, I suppose, the Speaker's comment earlier on the day of 26 June. I will endeavour to not traverse in detail the issues that have already been raised by the members for Springwood and Waterford, and I will certainly avoid any NRL analogies if I can.
I want to go straight to the terms of the standing order, which the member for Waterford has already touched on. I do not think the words of this standing order could be any clearer in practice. Certainly, we have got all of the background, all of the theoretical justifications and the principal justification for the sub judice rule to ensure we do not prejudice the administration of justice, but this standing order is unequivocal.
Subsection 233(4) says in as many words—
The sub judice rule does not apply to civil proceedings other than those referred to in (3).
Subsection (3) is really clear that those are only civil cases in courts of law where a jury is to be empanelled. This is not such a case, as the member for Waterford made clear already. This is a judicial review proceeding in a civil court that does not satisfy the criteria set out in 233(3). In that case, 233(4) applies and it tells us the sub judice rule does not apply. I do not think it could be much more straightforward than that.
I think it is important to have a look back at some of the ways this was addressed in the Speaker's ruling itself. Other members have also referred to what the Speaker said in his more detailed ruling. When he came back later in that question time, he made this observation—
It follows that all applications made relating to the criminal matter, including appeals on any order, would also be considered sub judice.
First of all, it needs to be made clear that this is not an appeal. It is a new proceeding. Yes, it is related to another proceeding, but it is a separate proceeding in the Supreme Court so it is not an appeal. I am not clear whether that is a misunderstanding on the Speaker's part or if there is another explanation. It does not follow that, simply because it is related to another matter, the terms of the standing orders should not apply.
The member for Moggill made the point before that this is not some external legal principle; this is a constraint that is imposed on this parliament by itself. Absolutely, and it is a constraint that is imposed on the parliament in the terms expressed in the standing orders. There is a straight-up literal meaning in standing order 233. Frankly, for us to just pretend that those words do not exist in their application in this place makes a bit of a joke of the entire standing orders. I think there is plenty of conduct in here that undermines the credibility or utility or our genuine interest in applying those standing orders to their meaning, but it cannot be the case that they mean nothing in a circumstance like this.
The member for Glass House made the point that he would almost never contemplate challenging a ruling. That is his prerogative if that is the way he wants to approach it, but I am of the view that the standing orders have to mean something. They have to be rules that guide our behaviour that can actually be understood, interpreted and applied to particular circumstances. The literal meaning of those words has to be something that we can rely on. It is important in a case like this to draw that meaning out, to make sense of it and to attempt to get some consistency and clear understanding of what it means and how it is applied.
The context here I think is really relevant. Again, I do not want to labour the point, but the question I asked of the Attorney on 23 June referred to a tabled document. That document made clear that it was a judicial review case. There could be no real misunderstanding at that point that we were not dealing with a civil matter. We were clearly dealing with a matter that did not fall afoul of standing order 233. The Attorney-General's answer was almost unusually direct and brief. It was a question she was prepared to answer. This is not a reflection on the Attorney-General herself but rather the way that ministers in general approach answering questions in question time. A prepared answer is not something I think I have ever received in question time. She had the prepared answer and made no suggestion that it might be sub judice. In fact, she suggested that the question the member for Algester subsequently asked would be the appropriate question to ask.
I will skip over the Speaker's comments about my supposedly skirting around a suppression order in debate, although I can only assume that there is no suggestion in those comments that my comments in debate were in any way sub judice. I will not rehash the content of the question. We know what the question was; it was about what money was spent. This is not to do with the criminal matter. It is not in any way capable of prejudicing the administration of justice, unless as others have suggested we are going to impugn the decision-making capacity of our Supreme Court judges. There is no real risk in this circumstance of genuine prejudice to the administration of justice.
Honestly, we have heard different takes from different members in here about the importance of precedent or the fact that everyone conducts themselves differently from how they do it in Westminster and that they might be the template. The Leader of the House himself said that there were two distinct rulings that look different but the Speaker is not bound by his ruling. Here is the rub: it is the Speaker sitting in that chair who makes the decisions. We can make all the appeals to authority or to precedent that we like, but in this case the question is whether the ruling can be justified and I would say, no, it cannot. This is not about preventing prejudice to legal proceedings. We cannot have rulings like this made simply because it is a topic of great sensitivity, and there is not a member in this House who does not know that it is a topic of great sensitivity.
I will leave my comments there—
Mr Kempton: Thank God.
Mr BERKMAN: If the member for Cook is keen, I could keep going. I have a minute and 48 seconds remaining to me. It might be worth considering that, when we look at our register of interests, the standing orders makes it clear enough that—
any other interest (whether or not of a pecuniary nature) of the member ...
(ii) that raises, appears to raise, or could foreseeably raise, a conflict between the member’s private interest and their duty as a member.
That is one that is a concern to the parliament under the standing orders. Perhaps it is worth the House considering if any such interests or potential conflicts of interest might come to bear in this debate or this vote when it is taken. That is where I will leave my comments.